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ABSTRACT
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)
currently lacks integrated policy guidelines for its distribution of funds at
regional, state and national levels. Smith (1993) examined ATSIC's
existing financial powers and budgetary processes and argued that its
financial objectives and the developing role of regional councils are
hindered by the lack of funding policy and by an overly complex,
functionally-based program structure. It was suggested that ATSIC
needed a funding model based on distributive equity, where program
expenditure would be allocated on the basis of relative need.
The present discussion paper develops the analysis of ATSIC's current
funding role, suggesting that future funding policy and practice should be
focused at the regional council level and equitably account for relative
levels of indigenous socioeconomic disadvantage, as well as between
indigenous peoples and the wider Australian population.
ATSIC is currently reassessing its methods for distributing financial
resources to indigenous organisations and communities and considering
the relevance of horizontal fiscal equalisation. This paper examines the
principle and methods of fiscal equalisation used by the Commonwealth
Grants Commission and critically investigates its suitability as a future
basis for ATSIC's allocation of funds to regional councils. While the
paper is exploratory, it suggests that the principle of equalisation provides
a potentially valuable distributive framework for ATSIC, but one which
would require substantial modification. In conclusion, a number of issues
associated with the use of equalisation are considered, including data
management; implications for ATSIC's program structure; for
government funding more broadly; and for ATSIC's potential co-
ordinating role at the intergovernmental and interagency level.
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The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)
currently lacks funding policy guidelines for its distribution of resources
at regional, state and national levels (Smith 1993; Office of Evaluation
and Assessment (OEA) 1991a, 1991b). Smith (1993) examined ATSIC's
existing financial powers and budgetary processes, arguing that its
financial objectives and the developing role of regional councils are
hindered by the lack of funding policy and by an overly complex,
functionally-based program structure. In particular, it was suggested that
ATSIC needs a funding model based on distributive equity; that is, one
which would result in a 'fair distribution of economic resources'
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992: 21).
While studies of Aboriginal socioeconomic status continue to reveal
considerable disadvantage compared with the total Australian population,
recent analyses by Tesfaghiorghis (1991) and Khalidi (1992) also indicate
substantial regional differences within the Aboriginal population itself.1
These regional socioeconomic variations have important implications for
the distribution of government funding to indigenous people, and for
program and policy effectiveness. Tesfaghiorghis has analysed these
variations at the ATSIC regional council level and pinpoints a crucial
policy issue when he questions whether ATSIC's program expenditure
should be allocated to regions on the basis of relative need.
The present discussion paper develops the analysis of ATSIC's current
funding role, suggesting that future funding policy and practice should
equitably account, at the regional council level, for relative levels of
disadvantage and different service needs within the indigenous population,
as well as between them and the wider Australian population. It is in this
context that the implications and potential relevance of distributive equity
as a national funding model for ATSIC are explored.
ATSIC is currently reassessing the methods it uses to distribute financial
resources to indigenous organisations and communities and is giving
consideration to the relevance of horizontal fiscal equalisation. The
Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), in its latest review of grant
relativities, has recommended that it might usefully work with ATSIC
'towards an approach for harmonising ATSIC's distribution principles
with fiscal equalisation' (CGC 1993: 65). This paper examines the
principle and methods of fiscal equalisation used by the CGC and
critically investigates its suitability as a future basis for ATSIC's
allocation of funds between regional councils. While the paper is
exploratory, it suggests that the principle of equalisation provides a
potentially valuable distributive framework for ATSIC, but is one which
would require substantial modification. The introduction of funding
equalisation has longer-term implications for ATSIC's program structure;
for its data management; for government funding more broadly; and for
ATSIC's potential co-ordinating role at the intergovernmental and
interagency level. These issues are considered in the conclusion.
The significance of socioeconomic variations between regional
councils
Whilst all ATSIC regional council populations display levels of
disadvantage greater than the total Australian, State and section-of-State
populations, there are even greater variations in socioeconomic status
between the regional council populations themselves (Tesfaghiorghis
1991). Socioeconomic variation within the Aboriginal population is
evident across a range of factors and can be examined at many levels. One
frequently referred to is the geographical section-of-State division
between urban and rural used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS) to collate aggregated census data. Another distinction is commonly
made between remote Aboriginal populations and communities, and those
in rural and urban areas of 'settled' Australia. Comparisons of Aboriginal
socioeconomic status can also be made between community types and
between family and household types. With the advent of ATSIC regional
council jurisdictions, another geographical basis for considering
socioeconomic variation has been created. This particular geographic
division is also one which is linked to specific program funding and
service delivery issues in ATSIC's budget. It has been argued that a
geographic orientation to program formulation and funding based on
ATSIC's regional council structure will become more important as
councils establish greater local influence with Aboriginal communities
and with State and local governments (Dillon 1992; Smith 1993). Future
ATSIC funding policy and practice will need to be more geographically
oriented to account for the different program priorities and funding needs
of its regional structure.
Selected regionally-based socioeconomic variations have been considered
for the ATSIC council areas by Tesfaghiorghis (1991) using 1986 Census
data and by Khalidi (1992). Indications of other possible regional
variations are provided by Altman and Gaminiratne (1992), Ross (1988),
Taylor (1991) and Daly (forthcoming). The differences initially apparent
between regional councils include population size, geographical area and
location. The regions also display a range of community types and
cultural characteristics and vary in their demographic profiles, health
characteristics, labour force participation rates, degree of involvement in
the informal economy, income levels, cost of living, educational
attainment, and household and family characteristics. Furthermore,
regional economies vary considerably according to the nature of the
labour market, the presence or absence of Aboriginal-owned land and
related economic development options, and the type and extent of
government funding and transfer flows into the region. Stage 1 of the
ATSIC (1992a) Housing and Community Infrastructure Needs Survey
revealed significant variations in infrastructure levels, housing and
community amenities between States, but has not yet been analysed by
council area. Regional plans could augment information on this
variability, as could the analysis of Census 1991 data currently being
obtained by ATSIC for all regional council areas.
Different levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, varying service provision
costs and different regional economic opportunities, will all create very
different program and funding needs between council areas. Smith (1993)
has argued that ATSIC's program structure needs to be streamlined and
based upon a narrower range of priority areas established by regional
councils (see also Dillon 1992). The distribution of ATSIC funds will
similarly need to be co-ordinated increasingly around the key program
needs of regions. This will require mechanisms by which assessments of
the relative disadvantages and cost disabilities between regions can be
made. The identification of these varying regional needs will highlight
equity of access to resources within the indigenous population, and the
different standard of services provided to them. It could enable funds to
be more effectively targeted towards identified areas of disadvantage and
assist in monitoring programs whose outcomes can be substantially
affected by such regional variations.
The pre-eminent ATSIC policy is self-determination. A central corporate
strategy for promoting this objective is to 'ensure that the Commission
and regional Councils have the capacity to plan, determine priorities and
allocate resources to enhance the lifestyle of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people' (ATSIC 1992b: 9). The need to equitably distribute
financial and other resources is arguably fundamental to such a strategy.
There is a demonstrated need within ATSIC for a funding framework
which enables the identification and prioritisation of regional needs on a
national basis and which facilitates an equitable distribution of ATSIC's
resources (see OEA 1991a, 1991b; Smith 1993). A potential option
available for addressing the existing inadequacies in its funding policy and
practice is for ATSIC to consider the relevance of horizontal fiscal
equalisation.
The principle of horizontal fiscal equalisation
Horizontal fiscal equalisation is the principle which has guided the
Commonwealth government's transfer of revenue to the States since the
1930s. It is based on principles of social justice and equity; that people
'should receive equal fiscal treatment by governments' (COC 1990: 20,
26, 110). Both the principle and assessment mechanisms have evolved
since then as a result of review recommendations by the COC, with
Commonwealth and State input. The CGC's role is to assess the revenue
needs of the States and Territories with the objective of achieving
horizontal equalisation in their capacity to provide a range of standard
services at standard prices. The end-product of its assessments is a set of
relativities used by the Commonwealth to determine the redistribution of
revenue it raises to each State.
COC recommendations for fiscal equalisation are based on a system of
periodic measurement of the standard budgets of each State. Over 100
functional areas of state revenue-raising and expenditure are assessed
against the Australian average (constituted by the average of all state
expenditure or revenue in a particular budgetary function). Activities
such as education, health, welfare, police and Aboriginal community
services are included, while housing and roads are excluded. The COC
emphasises recurrent, not capital, expenditures and assessments are based
on rolling five-yearly financial data to provide a degree of stability.
An important aspect of COC methodology is the identification and
measurement of the particular factors which differentially affect state
service-provision costs. These differences are called disability factors and
represent any influences beyond a State's control that require it to spend
more, or enable it to spend less. The COC assesses a wide range of
disabilities, including having different proportions of the population as
the target group for a service; the demographic and social composition of
the population; the physical, economic and environmental factors that may
adversely effect service delivery; economies and diseconomies of scale;
urbanisation; and the spatial distribution of the state population. Some
disabilities associated with the socioeconomic characteristics of the
indigenous population in each State are also included in CGC assessments
(Smith 1992a).
The CGC applies disability weights to the range of standard state
expenditure and revenue functions, to produce detailed factor values for
state budgetary components. These factor values are incorporated into its
determination of each State's total financial assistance requirements. This
latter total is expressed in the form of a State's final global relativity
factor, calculated by converting that requirement (after subtracting
Commonwealth specific purpose payments received by the State) to per
capita terms and expressing it as a proportion of the comparable
Victorian baseline figure. Final state relativities are based then on a sub-
set of detailed assessments for separate expenditure and revenue functions.
The degree of fiscal equalisation achieved between the States and
Territories is influenced by the budgetary needs that are incorporated and
the methods used for measuring them. The CGC relies heavily on data

An alternative approach is stock equalisation, which aims to equalise
capacity to establish and maintain capital stock and hence provide a level
of basic services; that is, to equalise past and present flows of capital
resources. In regard to stock equalisation, the COC (1990: 83)
distinguishes between that occurring 'with' and 'without memory1. In the
former approach, the history of capital stock creation within regional
council areas would be included. This would be extremely important for
ATSIC funding purposes as it takes into account the previous levels of
capital provided to communities and presumably, the variable (and in
some cases, very high) rates of capital depreciation. If one of ATSIC's
objectives in equalisation is to be stock equalisation, it would be
appropriate to include a lack of amenities' and depreciation factor when
assessing regional financial requirements, in order to acknowledge
existing considerable backlogs.2
Another related application is service equalisation, which aims to equalise
the provision of a range of services. Again, this could be oriented to
ATSIC's program areas. If service equalisation were pursued it would
highlight areas of underservicing and help target priorities within and
between regions.
A number of these applications of equalisation are appropriate to ATSIC's
distributive activities. The most practical focus for ATSIC would be to
equalise the flow of its resources (including the resulting capital stock) to
regional councils and to equalise the provision of those key services for
which it has budgetary responsibility. Such a funding model would need
to be based on assessments of identified levels of socioeconomic
disadvantage and the service provision cost disabilities operating between
the regions. In some respects the CGC's principle of fiscal equalisation is
well-suited to these potential areas of application by ATSIC; in other
areas it is not.
The limits of fiscal equalisation
While ATSIC clearly needs a more rational, integrated approach to its
distribution of monies (Smith 1993), it would also need a less complex
form of fiscal equalisation, adapted to suit its particular legal and
corporate objectives. The COC approach differs in certain fundamental
respects from the models of equalisation posed above as options for
ATSIC's financial operations. The CGC's objective is horizontal capacity
equalisation between States, based on providing the average level of
standard services and making an average effort to raise revenue. The
COC uses national and state averages as the starting point for all of its
determinations. There are no such standards or averages in Aboriginal
affairs and a great range of services are delivered by a multiplicity of
agencies. Given its limited budget and the low and variable level of
indigenous socioeconomic status, ATSIC will not be able to equalise the
broad expenditure capacities of regional councils. To do so would require
the co-ordination of all government funding and service delivery in the
Aboriginal affairs area. More to the point, regional councils do not have
fiscal capacities; they can neither receive or spend monies. It is the
distribution of ATSIC funds (including flow and stock aspects), and the
subsequent delivery of programs and services via regional council
authorisation, that should form the focus of an equalisation model. This
type of model could more appropriately be called distributive equity.
Adapting equalisation to ATSIC''s funding role
In order to equalise the flow of resources and service provision, ATSIC
would need to decide which disability factors and socioeconomic
disadvantages were pertinent to its own program activities. The CGC
ascertains a wide range of disability factors for which it establishes factor
values that are used to adjust financial assistance requirements in
particular budgetary areas. The CGC also accepts that it costs all States
more to provide services to Aboriginal people (CGC 1992: 8) and applies
an additional weight to the Aboriginal component of some expenditure
functions to account for the additional costs (see Smith 1992). For
example, when assessing factors relating to Aboriginality in the area of
pre-school education, the CGC determines a unit-of-use factor estimated
on the number of three-year-old Aboriginal children residing in non-
metropolitan areas of a State, added to the total four-year-old Aboriginal
population and three-year-olds from low income families in metropolitan
areas. To this is added a social composition factor where Aboriginal
children aged three and four years residing in non-metropolitan areas are
weighted by 1.7. The result is a set of comparative disability factor values
that can be applied to state expenditure requirements in this particular
service area. A range of these disability factor values are periodically
assessed at the State level by the CGC and could be broadly applied to
particular program areas of ATSIC's budget. However, the target
population would be within regional councils, not States.
The degree of funding equalisation able to be achieved will be influenced
by considerations related to measuring disability factors, including data
availability and their cultural applicability. There is always a degree of
subjective judgement in these measurements, as there would be in ATSIC
determinations. However, in establishing the practical parameters of
equalisation, ATSIC would be in a position to expand the range of
disabilities to cover its own financial role and to incorporate some aspects
of the unique cultural characteristics of the indigenous population which
might not necessarily be included in CGC assessments.3
An important determinant of cost levels and financial need is locational
disadvantage. This includes isolation, administrative scale, population
dispersion, urbanisation, the physical environment and stage of
development. The COC has argued that fiscal equalisation would not be
fully achieved if these disabilities were excluded from the assessment
process (COC 1990: 15). One such locational factor focuses on cost
differences between the States where the COC has determined that without
equalisation, the Northern Territory would have to incur per capita costs
of more than twice those of other States. New South Wales and Victoria
are relatively low-cost States, Western Australia and Tasmania would
incur costs 9 per cent above the average, while Queensland and South
Australian costs would be 4 per cent above the average (COC 1990: 15).
These comparative state disabilities indicate broad cost variations that will
affect Aboriginal organisations and communities at the State level.
These state variations and additional Aboriginal components to service
costs could be used to form a preliminary basis for an ATSIC equalisation
model. However, there are further cost variations within States that will
differentially affect regional council financial needs. To be effective, an
ATSIC approach to distributive equity would need to focus on the
regional level of its funding activities and a range of disabilities and cost
factors would have to be assessed at that level. If ATSIC were to proceed
with streamlining its program structure and formulating geographically-
based program packages around a narrower set of priority services (see
Dillon 1992; Smith 1993), it would be possible to assess a selected,
smaller group of factors relevant to those key areas. The important
methodological issue would be to relate disability factors to program
areas and, in turn, to regional program needs.
The end-product for the COC is the determination of a single, final
relativity factor for each State which is applied, as a per capita formula,
to the Commonwealth's redistribution of revenue to the States.
Undoubtedly, one could arrive at a single indicator of funding need for
each regional council area which could be used as a guiding basis for
establishing distributive equity. But the single indicator approach could
prove to be overly restrictive and inflexible for ATSIC's needs, especially
if it were subsequently taken to constitute 'the answer' to all funding
decisions. A range of indicators that focused on selected program funding
requirements and related disabilities would better suit the varying needs
of regional councils, at the same time as enabling assessments of
comparative funding need to be made. The advantage of the CGC's
approach to equalisation is that it does not have to be monolithic in its
application. Rather, it has the flexibility of being based on a package of
assessments, relevant to separate budgetary functions, which are
periodically updated. An ATSIC funding model would preferably retain
this flexibility rather than opting for a complex assessment system
producing an all-powerful single index figure that could potentially be
misused and poorly understood.
There are a number of other areas in which ATSIC could make the
instrument of equalisation more appropriate to its legal, cultural and
socioeconomic objectives. For example, the COC focuses on recurrent
expenditure activities and costs, so that capital expenditures are excluded.
In ATSIC's financial activities there is a blurred distinction between these
two areas, and, as noted previously, it could expand the range of
expenditure needs included in a funding model to cover capital costs.
Furthermore, ATSIC has considerable financial responsibilities (recurrent
and capital) for housing, roads and essential services, such as water,
sewerage and power in many communities, and should include them in its
assessment of regional needs and disabilities.
The Aboriginal Community Services (ACS) function is a special category
by which the COC assesses financial requirements in the provision of
Aboriginal community management and local government-type services,
as well as the recurrent costs of operating, repairing and maintaining
essential services such as water, power, sewerage, internal access roads,
airstrips, barge landings, telecommunications and cyclone shelters. It
excludes from its assessments local government funds which are
separately distributed to the States and not subject to CGC fiscal
equalisation. ATSIC may wish to distinguish the local-government-type
services provided by communities themselves (for example, through
community decisions to use Community Development Employment
Project (CDEP) scheme funds) from those funded by State and local
governments, in order to highlight areas where States are not assuming
their service roles. However, data on all these areas of government-type
service provision (community, local and State) within a region will be
extremely pertinent to assess the needs and requirements of different
regions. Further, the CGC only includes in the ACS category those
Aboriginal communities where the population is predominantly
Aboriginal and 'which are based on traditional culture' (CGC 1992: 10).
This restriction is inappropriate to ATSIC's activities and would need to
be expanded to include all indigenous populations wherever they live.
While the CGC assesses this function at the State level, consideration
could be given to assessing it for regional council areas. Certainly, there
appears to be data available for a number of elements of the ACS from
five-yearly ABS censuses and ATSIC's own survey information. The ACS
function, when related to ATSIC's program role, could constitute a
valuable initial step in establishing funding equalisation at the regional
council level.
As a practical instrument, distributive equalisation would establish the
type of funding framework called for by OEA reports (OEA 199la,
1991b) and, increasingly, by regional councils in their annual reports.
Importantly, it would enable the identification and prioritisation of
regional financial and program needs on a national basis. It would also
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highlight 'hot spots' of socioeconomic and service disadvantage which
could be linked to ATSIC programs. Areas of pressing local economic
need could be used to establish schedules of priorities within individual
councils and between regions. These schedules would facilitate ATSIC's
corporate plan to 'rigourously set priorities' (ATSIC 1992b: 6) and do so
in a manner which promoted allocative realism (Smith 1993). They would
also provide tangible plans against which levels of outstanding
disadvantage could be monitored.
The objectives of ATSIC equalisation would not simply be confined to
highlighting and overcoming relative disadvantage between regional
councils. That would effectively mean equalising to a common low
denominator of indigenous socioeconomic status. ATSIC has argued with
respect to its state grants that the ultimate aim is to achieve equity in
'basic' service provision comparable to that of the wider Australian
community (OEA 1991b: 9). While distributive equity between regions is
an important medium-term objective, the longer-term aim is equity with
the wider Australian population. In terms of this objective, equalisation
would be oriented towards benchmark standards based on the
socioeconomic status of the total Australian population, or to more
relevant comparable populations in similar geographic locations.4
A central aspect of the CGC's approach to fiscal equalisation is its
recognition of the policy and economic integrity of the respective States.
The theme of 'equality in diversity' is especially applicable to ATSIC. An
equalisation model for ATSIC would support local control in determining
program priorities and content, rather than imposing these centrally. This
regard for diversity is important when regional councils and constituent
communities have been shown to vary considerably in many respects.
Equalisation: implementation and implications for ATSIC
The crucial issue is not that a more equitable approach to funding
distribution is needed within ATSIC, but the extent to which such an
approach could be effectively implemented. To be feasible, an
equalisation funding model must be as simple as possible (after all, ATSIC
has to consider the financial needs of 60 regional councils); it must be
able to be progressively developed and implemented; amenable to
periodic update, preferably over a rolling period of more than one
financial year; and importantly, it must be sensitive to the changing nature
of ATSIC's program structure.
The role of the CGC
In its initial consideration of the feasibility of establishing a more
equitable funding approach, ATSIC might consider approaching the CGC
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to provide models oriented to the regional council level. In the
construction of such models, the COC could be requested to assess
regional council budgetary functions, including an ACS function; areas of
relative disadvantage between regions pertinent to those functions; sources
of available data apart from census information, including data from
regional plans and from indigenous organisations; and to present a
schedule of progressive implementation based upon key program areas.
The CGC (1993: 65) has recently highlighted the usefulness of its own
involvement in such a consideration as a means of 'harmonising ATSIC's
distribution principles with fiscal equalisation1.
Implications for ATSIC's data requirements
The possibility of equalisation raises many issues for ATSIC which will
require consideration. Equalisation is a relatively dynamic distribution
mechanism providing a potential framework for national funding
decisions by the ATSIC Board of Commissioners. However, it would be
heavily reliant upon regional councils providing data about local
priorities and particular areas of disability. While ATSIC can obtain
socioeconomic data from ABS censuses, at regional council level, this is
provided at five-yearly intervals without intercensal estimates. ATSIC
would require some standardised, comparative data from the regional
councils themselves. Important regional data include the number and type
of servicing agencies, including Aboriginal resource organisations;
funding into regions from all levels of government; changes in the
location of the Aboriginal population (for example, with the establishment
of new outstations or camps), and so on. ATSIC has the advantage,
through regional plans, of obtaining information to attune its decisions to
the cultural and socioeconomic characteristics of regional populations and
to the actual quality of service provision. But clearly, formal mechanisms
for collating, assessing and updating such data would need to established.
Most importantly, ATSIC would need to initiate a more regional
orientation to its data collection and analyses. As noted (Smith 1993), this
regional focus is evident in pressures for financial decentralisation and
regionalisation of ATSIC's program structure. ATSIC is currently
establishing mechanisms for obtaining funding distribution data at the
regional council level. This needs to be extended to include collation and
analysis of program data by regions as well. Funding equalisation would
require a system for updating financial and other data at the regional
level, at least on a yearly basis and preferably covering an extended
assessment period similar to that of the CGC. The CGC's usual sources of
data (ABS and State government submissions) should be extended for
ATSIC's purposes. For example, while the CGC measures hospital usage
for its assessment of health expenditure, it does not include data from
Aboriginal medical services. ATSIC is in a position to include within its
assessment, data from a range of Aboriginal service organisations, from
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Similarly, national program funds for CDEP scheme participant
communities have capital on-costs which are often directed to capital
works and community services. The receipt of such additional funds,
beyond income support entitlements, should be taken into account in an
equalisation model, for determining allocations to regions which do not
have CDEP scheme communities, or have fewer such communities and
therefore lower per capita funding. The effective distribution of national
program funding should be subject to equalisation at the regional council
level. For similar reasons, it can be argued that equalisation has potential
as a framework for determining ATSIC's distribution of state grants.
Distribution of these funds should, first and foremost, address the
concerns identified in regional plans and follow ATSIC's proposed
schedules of relative priorities for distributing funds between regional
councils.
Implications for government funding
By logical implication, the issue of distributive equity extends beyond
ATSIC's activities. After all, in 1991-92, 44 per cent of all
Commonwealth outlays on programs for indigenous people were made by
agencies other than ATSIC (Commonwealth of Australia 1992: 30).6 In
the longer-term, an ATSIC policy of equalisation could inform allocations
by all agencies at the regional council level.
If ATSIC proceeds with the negotiation of bilateral agreements with State
and Territory governments regarding the delivery and funding of
services to indigenous communities, the framework of distributive equity
could potentially provide a valuable mechanism by which ATSIC might
not only distribute its own funds between regional councils, but by which
it might attempt the long-heralded co-ordination of service delivery and
funding in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs more generally.
Conclusion
Equalisation's broad objectives would support flexibility in the pursuit of
different budgetary and program aims at the regional level, accommodate
changing socioeconomic factors affecting regional populations, and
recognise the crucial impact of regional economic and social diversity on
financial assistance requirements. These characteristics make it especially
suited to the cultural and economic heterogeneity of the indigenous
population, to the evolving relationship between ATSIC's board, its
regional structure and central administration, and to ATSIC's particular
objective of furthering indigenous economic, social and cultural
development in all its diversity. Equalisation offers a potentially valuable
policy instrument and funding mechanism to ATSIC, but careful
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consideration needs to be given to the extent to which it can be effectively
implemented and maintained.
Many of the broader issues and implementation difficulties that are raised
when considering the option of funding equalisation are more closely
linked to the deficiencies created by ATSIC's current lack of funding
policy guidelines and mechanisms than to the relevance of the equalisation
principle itself. The proposal of alternative distribution options throws
into sharp relief a number of crucial issues that currently affect ATSIC's
operation, including the need for change in its program structure; far
more effective analysis of program outcomes at the regional council level;
the issues of financial self-determination and decentralisation within the
ATSIC structure; and the wider imperative to establish a more holistic,
integrated approach to funding in Aboriginal affairs at the
intergovernmental and interagency level. ATSIC's evolving financial
structure and role are poorly served by a complex, cumbersome program
structure, by inadequate mechanisms for fairly assessing regional funding
needs, and by the apparent absence of any funding policy by which
national and regional funding decisions and planning can be guided. If
equalisation is difficult to achieve in practice, it nevertheless presents
ATSIC with an alternative approach that may result in a more effective
distribution of resources to areas of greatest need, and which may greatly
assist in the resolution of some of these more enduring difficulties long
associated with funding and performance in Aboriginal public policy.
Notes
1. The terms 'Aboriginal' and 'indigenous' are used throughout this paper to refer to
both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
2. ATSIC has previously argued to the COC that it should accept and assess a 'lack of
amenities' disability factor for the Aboriginal population in the Northern Territory
because of the considerable backlog in basic infrastructure and community
amenities in many Aboriginal communities (ATSIC 1991). The need for such a
disability factor extends to many Aboriginal communities in other States and
highlights the considerable differences between communities in the level of
amenities that have been provided by government.
3. For example, culturally-based views of what constitutes housing and housing need
may vary between regions; sources of cash income may be supplemented by
activity within the informal economy in some regions and not others; some
outstation populations may require low maintenance technology and a more
restricted range of basic amenities than larger communities. Not only the costs of
providing services, but the type of services required may vary considerably from
one region to another.
4. It may well be that comparative assessment of well-being and socioeconomic status
of indigenous populations in remote locations should more appropriately be made
with the wider population in a similar area. For example, the CGC's (1989)report
to the Commonwealth government on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands argued that the
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Standard of living of the Cocos Malay community 'should be comparable to that
enjoyed by other remote Australian communities'. In making this comparison the
inquiry took into account the range and quality of public services, demographic
characteristics, cultural and social characteristics, the level of taxes and charges, the
social security benefits available, employment opportunities, productivity and the
pattern of employment, wage and money income levels, the cost of living, the
quality of housing and community infrastructure, and the quality of the environment
including facilities for recreation, education and information services (COC 1989:
6). The COC took these factors to be indicative of the standard of living reflected in
services provided by the Commonwealth government, and used them to establish a
schedule for raising the level of Cocos Island services to the relevant Australian
standard; that is, a remote Australian population.
5. The COC assesses both the expenditure functions and revenue-raising efforts of
States in determining their financial assistance requirements. ATSIC will need to
decide whether it includes in its equalisation model the level of revenue contribution
made by communities to meet their service costs. The Australian National Audit
Office (ANAO) review of ATSIC regional administration recommended that
regional managers negotiate service agreements with the communities and
organisations they serve, specifying 'an appropriate level of service from the
Regional Office' and defining 'the obligations of the community to ATSIC (ANAO
1992: 18-9). The OEA's audit of ATSICs community infrastructure program
defined this obligation as including a consideration of community contributions to
developing and maintaining infrastructure (ATSIC 1991: 90). A suggestion being
made in this paper (see also Smith 1992b: 24) is that communities themselves
initiate such service models covering all service areas being delivered by all
government agencies. ATSIC would, in turn, need to consider whether revenue-
rasing capacity should be incorporated in an equalisation model, given the variable
and low levels of ATSI income.
6. In the previous financial year, ATSICs expenditure represented 55 per cent of all
Commonwealth outlays by agencies on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
programs (Commonwealth of Australia 1991: 20). For the most part, these data on
Commonwealth expenditure are based on a combination of outlays made via
specific programs for indigenous people and mainstream programs which have
been adapted to contain a specific indigenous element. Expenditure on mainstream
programs which are of particular relevance, but have not been specially developed
to suit the needs of indigenouspeople, have not been included in this estimate.
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